Intel Slava Z
Seen on Pro-Ukie Twitter today, it’s worth contextualizing this: 1) What, exactly, is the AFU supposed to do with shell shortages for two years? 2) 90,000 a month is 1,080,000 per annum. Current Russian rates are estimated at around 3.4 million and expected…
Further, such ambitious plans need to be taken into review with extreme skepticism. Recent analysis by CSIS revealed that the current production rate is less than 4,000 shells a month. Back in December, the U.S. Army stated it's intent to increase the rate up to 20,000 per month (240,000 per year) by the spring of 2023 and 40,000 per month (480,000 per year) by 2025. Thus, there is no margin for a sixfold increase over a shorter span of time, which should be obvious given the U.S. currently only has one RDX/HDX plant functioning in the entirety of its territory.
As CSIS continues, at this surge rate it would take about six years to rebuild inventories allowing for normal peacetime usage and assuming no further transfers from inventory. Given transfers to Ukraine is the rationale behind the expansion of capacity in the first place, it is thus notable that CSIS directly states even the 2025 surge rate would satisfy only a third of the needs based upon the Summer of 2022 firing rates of the AFU.
As CSIS continues, at this surge rate it would take about six years to rebuild inventories allowing for normal peacetime usage and assuming no further transfers from inventory. Given transfers to Ukraine is the rationale behind the expansion of capacity in the first place, it is thus notable that CSIS directly states even the 2025 surge rate would satisfy only a third of the needs based upon the Summer of 2022 firing rates of the AFU.
CSIS
Rebuilding U.S. Inventories: Six Critical Systems
Are U.S. weapons inventories getting too low because of transfers to Ukraine? Although most inventories are acceptable, some key munitions will take many years to replace. Often, there are workarounds, but there may be a crisis brewing over artillery ammunition.